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REVISING THE ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
TO ACCOMMODATE INTERNET-BASED
PERSONAL CONTACTS
Matthew L. Perdoni*
INTRODUCTION

From online banking, to cyber-shopping, to the growth of social-networking
websites, the Internet is a medium for human interaction as much as it is a part of
modern commerce and business, and now encompasses nearly every facet of
American life. By all indications, use will become more widespread and complex
over time. The Internet now facilitates the modern functional equivalent of
human interaction, and provides worldwide access to users with the mere click of
a button. For these reasons, examining the role of the Internet in the law is critical. Particularly, it is necessary to consider whether and to what extent Internet
users are subject to personal jurisdiction as a result of their online activities.

I.

THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNET

& ITS

APPEARANCE IN THE LAW

Technology first entered the educational system with limited library-based Internet access and video-linked classrooms.' But by 2006-2007, 66% of two and
four-year degree-granting schools offered some type of online coursework, and
there were over 12 million enrollments in some form of online or other distancelearning courses.2 Now, even the legal system has embraced the free flow of information and the economic benefits made possible by the Internet, and this
trend shows no signs of slowing. 3
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.
Matthew L. Perdoni, Co-Editor-in-Chief and Publications Editor of the University of the District of
Columbia Law Review, would like to thank Professors Edward Allen and Christine Jones for their
support and guidance, as well as the Law Review's Editorial Board, Senior Editors, and Associate
Editors for their assistance throughout the publication process. Finally, the author expresses his eternal gratitude to Paula, Louis, Katey, Chris, and Meredith for their unwavering support.
1 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REv. 97 (2000)
(discussing the progression of the Internet from its early use as a primarily government, military, and
education information transfer network, to its more modern form); Table 427, NAT'L CENTER FOR
EDUC. STAT., available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_427.asp (citing various
statistics on the consistently growing role of the Internet in schools, including the estimate that Internet access in schools rose from 35% in 1994 to 95% in 1999, and that the figure has remained at
100% since 2003).
2 Basmat Parsad & Laurie Lewis, Distance Education at Degree-GrantingPostsecondaryInstitutions: 2006-07, U.S. DEP'T OF Eouc., NAT'L CENTER FOR Eouc. STAT., & INST. or EDUc. Sc. (2008),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009044.pdf.
3 Early on, courts recognized the rapid expansion of Internet use. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The nature of the Internet is such that it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to determine its size at a given moment. It is indisputable, however, that the Internet has
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Included in its vast research portfolio, the Pew Foundation has conducted a
series of surveys on the prevalence and characteristics of Internet use in
America.' Studies from the Pew Internet and American Life Project illustrate the
growth of Internet use over the past decade and its ever-growing prominence in
everyday life. According to one study, about 15% of American adults used the
Internet in 1995.5 Five years later, this figure soared to roughly half of the adult
population. 6 By 2005, nearly 70% of adults in the United States were Internet
users, and in Pew's April 2009 survey, the figure approached 80%.7 The rise in
Internet use coincided with the increased capacity to access the Internet in homes
and workplaces across the country. Less than 5% of American adults had a
broadband connection in 2000, but the percentage neared 35% by 2005.8 Now,
approximately 60% of adults have a broadband-Internet connection, 9 and estimates show that 100% of schools provide Internet access. 10
Moreover, a growing number of activities can be conducted in cyberspace. In
2008-2009, nearly 60% of adults in the United States executed an online
purchase, over 40% handled banking over the Internet, nearly 30% read a "blog"
posting (with 10% writing their own posting), and about 10% downloaded files
using peer-to-peer networks." The number of activities and encounters facilitated by the Internet continues to grow, and new cyber-forums and web technologies are taking hold faster than ever. When such innovative functions are coupled
with the rapid progression of general Internet use and improvements in accessiexperienced extraordinary growth in recent years. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to
the Internet, and by 1989, the number stood at fewer than 90,000 computers. By 1993, over 1,000,000
computers were linked. Today, over 9,400,000 host computers worldwide, of which approximately 60
percent located within the United States, are estimated to be linked to the Internet. This count does
not include the personal computers people use to access the Internet using modems. In all, reasonable
estimates are that as many as 40 million people around the world can and do access the enormously
flexible communication Internet medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users
by the year 1999.").
4

See PEW IN-TERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJFecr, http://www.pewinternet.org/ (last visited

Mar. 14, 2010). For a complete listing of the Pew Foundation studies, see PEW INTERNE r & AM. LIE
PROJEcr, http://pewinternet.org/Data-Tools/Download-Data/Data-Sets.aspx (last visited Mar. 14,
2010).
5 Internet Adoption Over Time, PEW INTERNEr & AM. LiFE PROmicr, http://www.pewinternet.
org/Trend-Data/Internet-Adoption.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8

Home Broadband Adoption, 2000-2010, PEw INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, http://www.

pewinternet.orgffrend-Data/Home-Broadband-Adoption.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
9 Id.
10

Table 427, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDuc. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/

dt08_427.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
11 Online Activities, 2000-2009, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJEcr, http://www.pewinternet.
orgffrend-Data/Online-Activities-20002009.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
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bility discussed above, the volume of information available to the average person
becomes staggering.
The internet's increasing role in American life also is attributable to its ability
to facilitate the modern functional equivalent of face-to-face interaction. Where
8% of adults had a social-networking profile on websites like Facebook or Myspace in 2005, by 2009, 35% had such profiles.' 2 Although only 11% of adult Internet users had a Twitter account in April 2009, that figure nearly doubled by
October of that year.' 3 And all of the statistics presented to this point overlook
the most dominant segment of Internet users; those under the age of thirty. In
2009, an estimated 95% of eighteen to twenty-nine-year-olds used the Internet, as
compared to 87% of thirty to forty-nine-year-olds, and 78% of fifty to sixty-fouryear-olds. 14 Incoming generations are exposed to cyberspace and related technologies earlier than ever before. This fosters their reliance on such technologies,
and that reliance subsequently is reinforced through schools, peer groups, and
future work experiences; thus, further entrenching Internet-based contacts as the
modern functional equivalent of human interaction.
Internet use may start with e-mail correspondence at work or in the home, but
the research suggests that this quickly leads to more frequent personal use for
general "web-surfing." Moreover, the advent of interactive telephones and other
wireless devices has resulted in 24-hour Internet accessibility in nearly every setting.' 5 Initiation to the Internet also is occurring at younger ages. Where the majority of online activities by older age brackets typically center on routine
Internet use, younger users engage in more advanced activities.' 6 Thus, it stands
to reason that Internet use will become even more prevalent in everyday life. For
this reason, it is critical to examine its role in the context of the law.

12 Amanda Lenhart, Pew Internet Project Data Memo, PEW INTERNET & AM. Liwe' PROJECT
(2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIPAdult_social-networking-datamemoFINAL.pdf.
13 Susannah Fox, Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Twitter & Status Updating, Fall 2009,
PEW INTERNFT & AM. LIFE PRome-r, http://www.pewinternet.org/~/medial/Files/Reports/2009/PIP
TwitterFall_2009web.pdf.
14 Demographics of Internet Users, PEw IrriFERNET & AM. LimE PROJEcr, http://www.pewinter
net.org/Trend-Data/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
15 See generally PEW INTERNEr & AM. Liwn PROJEcr weblinks, supra notes 13-14. See also
Haya El Nasser, Census Gets New Interactive Website: Step Reflects Huge Leap in Net Use, USA ToDAY, Oct. 23, 2009, at 3A; The Mobile Difference - Tech User Types, PEw INTERNEr & AM. Lweu

PROnEcr, http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/The-Mobile-Difference-Tech-User-Types.aspx
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010); GenerationalDifference in Online Activities, PEw INTERNET & AM. Lwi.
PROJEcr, http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/Generational-differences-in-online-activities.aspx
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010).

16 See supra note 15. In fact, these studies show that the complexity of activities runs converse
to the age of the user.
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Courts began hearing Internet-based disputes shortly after Internet use extended into people's business and personal worlds." Courts hearing Internet-related cases immediately faced challenges when determining their jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants.' 8 These complications were the result of the broad accessibility to information provided via the Internet, the unusual application of the
law in cyberspace, and the delicate policy concerns surrounding the exercise of a
court's power over the first generation of Internet-based claims.1 9 It comes as no
surprise that such litigation increased parallel to the growth of the Internet
throughout the late 1990's and into the early 2000's, and that these disputes now
are commonplace in state and federal courts.
The Internet's role in shaping the law is covered throughout this paper. Before
moving forward, though, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the Internet
facilitates the modern functional equivalent of physical presence, albeit a form
unforeseeable at the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, or even Shaffer v. Heitner.2 o As will be examined throughout, the nature of
Internet-based contacts provides a basis for personal jurisdiction consistent with
these longstanding requirements, despite some courts' reluctance toward adopting such a position.
II.

THE HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND AN EYE
TOWARD ITS FUTURE

In this section, the general history, conceptualization, and requirements of personal jurisdiction are outlined. These topics are covered in detail sufficient for the
17 See infra note 19.
18 See infra note 19.
19 See, e.g., Pres-Kap, Inc. v. Sys. One, 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("Across
the nation, in every state, customers of 'on-line' computer information networks have contractual
arrangements with out-of-state supplier companies . . . Lawyers, journalists, teachers, physicians,
courts, universities, and business people throughout the country daily conduct various types of computer-assisted research over telephone lines linked to supplier databases located in other states.
[Without strict jurisdictional guidelines] users of such 'on-line' services could be haled into court in
the state in which supplier's billing office and database happen to be located, even if such users ... are
solicited, engaged, and serviced entirely instate by the supplier's local representatives. Such a result,
in our view, is wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of such computer-information users, and,
accordingly, the result offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.") (citations omitted); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (weighing 1st Amendment rights and
policy considerations in determining whether a statute barring "obscene or indecent [materials posted
on websites], knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age" was unconstitutional); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding
that the existing tests for exercising a court's power over non-resident businesses are sufficient regardless of whether transactions are conducted over the Internet).
20 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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analysis of personal jurisdiction in the context of Internet-related conduct
presented in the following sections.
A.

International Shoe and Its Progeny

To hale a non-resident defendant into a foreign jurisdiction, the two-pronged
test set forth in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington and expounded in its progeny must be satisfied. 21 The first prong of the test requires that a non-resident
"have certain minimum contacts" with the forum state, such that they could reasonably foresee being haled into court there as a result. 22 In other words, courts
must examine the nexus between the forum, the litigation, and the non-resident
over whom jurisdiction is sought.2 3 The longstanding requirement is that "in each
case ... there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 24 Thus, the minimum contacts requirement includes an element of intent; as a result, unilateral acts by others or "random,
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts" will not satisfy the first prong of the test. 25
Instead, "U]urisdiction [only] is proper ... where the contacts proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with
the forum State." 26 The nature and quality of a non-resident's conduct in the
21 326 U.S. at 316. Although a more detailed examination may be required in some jurisdictions, those with long-arm statutes conferring the full reach permitted under the U.S. Constitution
need only meet the International Shoe test for a court to exercise its power over a non-resident. See,
e.g., Fix My PC, L.L.C. v. N.FN. Assoc., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1999). Most states
now include "doing business" clauses and other such language in their long-arm statutes to address
the problem of determining a non-resident's amenability to litigation in the forum where their conduct does not include a physical presence. See, e.g., MINN STAr § 543.19 Subd. 1(1), (2), (4) (2009)
("[A] court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over
any foreign corporation or any nonresident individual, or the individual's personal representative, in
the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a resident of this state.
This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the foreign corporation or nonresident individual: (1) owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this state, or; (2) Transacts
any business within the state, or ... (4) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property
damage in Minnesota [subject to specified limitations]."). Courts tend to interpret these broader statutory allowances as granting the full jurisdictional power permitted by the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977) (holding
that although Texas incorporates "doing business" language in its long-arm statute, the "other acts
that may constitute doing business" clause grants the full power permitted by the Due Process
Clause).
22 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted).
23 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977), enforced, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 775 (1984).
24 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (emphasis added), enforced, Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985), and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 109 (1987).
25 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462, 480 (1985).
26 Id. at 475.
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forum state establishes a court's power over that individual.2 7 However, a defendant need not be physically present in the forum to establish the requisite minimum contacts. 28
The second prong of the International Shoe test examines whether haling the
defendant into a foreign court comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.29 Even if a non-resident defendant has the requisite minimum
contacts with the forum state, constitutional due process requires courts to weigh
a number of factors before exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident. These include: "[1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the interests of the forum State, [3]
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief . . . [4] the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies . . . [5] and the

shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies."30 Despite its formulaic presentation, fair play and substantial justice is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 31 Most often, "[w]hen minimum contacts have
been established, the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of
jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant." 32
This is the natural result of the defendants purposefully availing him or herself of
the forum state's laws.3 3 Thus, when a plaintiff establishes the first prong of the
InternationalShoe test, the second prong generally also is satisfied.3 4
27 Id. at 474-75.
28 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court noted that 'as technological progress has increased the flow of
commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase.' Twenty seven
years later [in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz], the Court observed that jurisdiction could not be
avoided 'merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum state. The Court observed
that: It is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of commercial
business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the
need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted."') (citations omitted).
29 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
30 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
31 See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citing Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
32 Kulko, 436 U.S. at 114.
33 See Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005) (holding
that "by invoking the benefits and protections of a forum's laws, a nonresident consents to suit
there").
34 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985) (The Court suggests a
burden-shift in the analysis of fair play and substantial justice for certain types of claims. "[W]here a
defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction,
he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Most such considerations usually may be accommodated through means short
of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional. . . . [and] minimum requirements inherent in the concept of
'fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant
has purposefully engaged in forum activities . . . . As we previously have noted, jurisdictional rules
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When a non-resident's forum presence arises from internet-based contacts, the
personal jurisdiction evaluation may become complicated. In Hanson v. Denckla,
the Supreme Court noted how technological and other advances lessened the
burdens of litigating in foreign jurisdictions. However, significant Due Process
concerns have arisen in Internet-related cases. Courts have taken great care to
limit their power when establishing jurisdiction over non-residents in such instances. Nevertheless, this may unreasonably burden resident-plaintiffsseeking to
vindicate various personal and proprietary rights. Moreover, a limited jurisdictional approach permits non-resident defendants to encumber residents' rights
without immediate consequence.
B.

The Evolution of in rem Jurisdiction

In rem is a Latin phrase, meaning "against a thing," and "[i]nvolv[es] or
determin[es] the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally
with respect to that thing."3 6 Thus, an action in rem "determines the title to property and the rights of the parties, not merely among themselves, but also against
all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property." 3 7
Early cases often involved one party attaching a non-resident defendant's
property either to establish personal jurisdiction over them, or to satisfy an existing judgment.38 Plaintiffs served constructive notice by attaching the non-resimay not be employed in such a way as to make litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a
party unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent.").
35 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Note that the Court raised these concerns over a half-century ago. Id. at
250-51. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (summarizing
the Court's history of dealing with the second prong of the Int'l Shoe test); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) ("[I]ncreasing nationalization of commerce has [brought] a great
increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. . . . [but at] the same time
modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to
defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.").
36 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 809 (8th ed. 2004). See also RiSTATEMENT (SeCOND) OF JUDGME'NTs § 6 ("In traditional terminology, 'in rem' and 'quasi in rem' proceedings are subdivided into
three types. The first is called a 'true' in rem proceeding, or one 'against all the world.' In this type of
proceeding, the court undertakes to determine all claims that anyone has to the thing in question. The
second type is called a 'quasi in rem' proceeding and is one in which the court undertakes to determine the claims of specifically identified persons to the thing in question. The third type was and is
also called a proceeding 'quasi in rem' but is now often called attachment or garnishment jurisdiction.
In this type of proceeding, a thing owned by a specified person is seized as a basis for exercising
jurisdiction to decide a claim against the owner. The claim does not concern interests in the thing; it
concerns some other transaction.").
37 BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 32 (8th ed. 2004). It also should be noted that in some in rem
cases "the named defendant is real or personal property." Id. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557
(1871).
38 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1878) ("Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold
and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in
virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its
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dent's land in the forum state, establishing jurisdiction over them regardless of
the subject matter of the pending lawsuit. Under these circumstances, a court
exercised quasi in rem jurisdiction over a non-resident property owner. 39 It was
not until Shaffer v. Heitner that the often grossly unjust outcomes resulting from
quasi in rem proceedings were abolished.4 0 The focus shifted to "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation . . ."41 and absent some relationship with the pending litigation, a non-resident's ownership of land in the
forum no longer provided a basis for personal jurisdiction. Thus, comporting with
the requirements of constitutional due process requires application of "the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in InternationalShoe." 42
III.

NEW JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES IN INTERNET-RELATED LMGATION

Courts hearing the first generation of Internet cases were charged with reconciling existing laws with a new communicative medium. Over time, legislatures
and courts alike responded with several new approaches (or at least redefined
existing methods), for dealing with Internet-based cases. This section examines
the early history of Internet-related litigation, a notable statute dealing with such
cases, and two prominent tests that have emerged from the fifteen years of Internet-related litigation.
tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then
be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-residents
have no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate . . . . Thus, in
Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mas. 35, Mr. Justice Story said . .. '[where [a party] is not within [the forum], and
is not personally subject to its laws, if, on account of his supposed or actual property being within the
territory, process by the local laws may, by attachment, go to compel his appearance, and for his
default to appear judgment may be pronounced against him, such a judgment must, upon general
principles, be deemed only to bind him to the extent of such property, and cannot have the effect of a
conclusive judgment in personam, for the plain reason, that, except so far as the property is concerned, it is a judgment coram non judice.'").
39

BLACK'S LAw DICflONARY 809 (8th ed. 2004) ("Involving or determining the rights of a

person having an interest in property located within the court's jurisdiction.").
40 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977) ("[Tlhe presence of property in a State may bear on the existence
of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For
example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the
plaintiffand the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have
jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the State would normally
indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest. The State's strong
interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for
peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction,
as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State. The presence
of property may also favor jurisdiction in cases, such as suits for injury suffered on the land of an
absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action
is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that ownership.") (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
41 Id. at 204.
42 Id. at 207.
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The "First Generation" of Internet-Related Litigation

The initial problem facing the courts was characterizing Internet-activity
within existing legal frameworks. 43 Thus, early cases reflected a cautious approach by the courts. In ACLU v. Reno, the court granted a motion enjoining
enforcement of a newly enacted statute, and impliedly rejected the notion that
the judiciary should have responsibility over monitoring Internet conduct due to
the potential infringement on personal liberties. 44 Likewise, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, the court declined jurisdiction over a Missouri resident based
43 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32, 838, 842-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Discussing in relevant
part that "[t]he Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a network of networks. This
is best understood if one considers what a linked group of computers -referred to here as a 'network'is, and what it does. Small networks are now ubiquitous (and are often called 'local area networks')
. . . [They] are connected to other networks, which are in turn connected to other networks in a
manner which permits each computer in any network to communicate with computers on any other
network in the system. This global Web of linked networks and computers is referred to as the Internet
. . . The resulting whole is a decentralized, global medium of communications -or 'cyberspace'- that
links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world. The Internet is an international system. This communications medium allows any of the literally tens of millions of people with
access to the Internet to exchange information. These communications can occur almost instantaneously, and can be directed either to specific individuals, to a broader group of people interested in a
particularsubject, or to the world as a whole. . . . No single entity -academic, corporate, governmental,
or non-profit- administers the Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of
thousands of separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to use
common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information with other computers
(which in turn exchange communications and information with still other computers). There is no
centralized storage location, control point, or communications channel for the Internet, and it would
not be technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Internet
. . . . The Internet is not exclusively, or even primarily, a means of commercial communication. Many
commercial entities maintain Web sites to inform potential consumers about their goods and services,
or to solicit purchases, but many other Web sites exist solely for the dissemination of non-commercial
information. The other forms of Internet communication -e-mail, bulletin boards, newsgroups, and
chat rooms- frequently have non-commercial goals . . . . Such diversity of content on the Internet is
possible because the Internet provides an easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to reach a large audience, potentially of millions . . .. Any Internet user can communicate by posting a message to one of
the thousands of newsgroups and bulletin boards or by engaging in an on-line 'chat,' and thereby
reach an audience worldwide that shares an interest in a particular topic . . . . Because of the different
forms of Internet communication, a user of the Internet may speak or listen interchangeably, blurring
the distinction between 'speakers' and 'listeners' on the Internet. Chat rooms, e-mail, and newsgroups
are interactive forms of communication, providing the user with the opportunity both to speak and to
listen . . . . It follows that unlike traditionalmedia, the barriersto entry as a speaker on the Internet do
not differ significantly from the barriersto entry as a listener. Once one has entered cyberspace, one
may engage in the dialogue that occurs there. In the argot of the medium, the receiver can and does
become the content provider, and vice-versa . . . . The Internet is therefore a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication.") (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 824, 831, 855 (recognizing the potential for indecent materials to reach children, but
nevertheless determining that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 was unconstitutional, because it infringed on 1st Amendment rights).
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on his operating a website that used the plaintiff's trademarked club name.45
There, the court recognized the potential for exposing website owners to general
jurisdiction in every forum.4 6
However, other courts were not so restrictive. For example, the court in Inset
Systems v. Instruction Set, held that by posting Internet advertisements and contact information on its website, mailing print catalogues, and engaging in other
limited contacts with the state, the defendant purposefully availed himself of the
benefits and protections of Connecticut, as well as any other forum receiving the
advertisements. 47 Other courts, while allowing Internet-activities to form a basis
for personal jurisdictional, did so in a more limited fashion.4 8 For example, in
Plus Systems v. New England Network, the court held that a Connecticut defendant was amenable to suit in Colorado despite their being no physical presence
there.4 9 In examining the first-prong of the InternationalShoe test, the court reasoned while "[tihere could be no dispute over minimum contacts had Defendant
physically flown to Colorado .

.

. and asked Plaintiff to perform [services] ...

Defendant's use of Plaintiff's [services] to effect the same result is no less an
availment of Colorado and its laws." 5 0
Although the law has achieved some degree of clarity in the years since the
first generation of Internet cases, decisions on whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents in such suits still are far from uniform. The remaining
subsections examine modern jurisdictional approaches, and identify several barriers that litigants may face when seeking to vindicate their rights.
B.

The Anticybersquatting and Consumer ProtectionAct

In rem jurisdiction was common prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in International Shoe, and even leading up to the Court's decision in Shaffer. In recent
years, courts and legislatures have revived in rem proceedings as a means for
responding to increases in Internet-related lawsuits. One notable example is the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)."
45 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
46 Id. at 297, 301.
47 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
48 See e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. 3d 1257, 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
defendant's voluntary business interactions in Ohio, and its benefiting from the plaintiff's marketing
efforts, satisfied the Int'l Shoe test); see also Mark C. Dearing, PersonalJurisdiction and the Internet:
Can the TraditionalPrinciplesand Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System into the 21st Century, 4 3.
TECH. L. & POL'Y (Spring 1999) (discussing in detail the importance of the holding in CompuServe
v. Patterson, and its implications in subsequent internet-based litigation).
49 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
50 Id. at 119.
51 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1999) [hereinafter ACPA].
In 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) was added as an amendment to The Trademark Act of 1946, otherwise
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Under the ACPA, Congress established procedural and remedial measures for
plaintiffs alleging infringement on their protected website domain names. However, the ACPA is not without flaws. Initiating litigation under the ACPA requires overcoming several barriers. Although at first glance section 1125
(d)(1)(E) of the ACPA indicates a broad scope of conduct providing a basis for
litigation, the specified activities, and the use of the term "transactions," suggests
a strictly commercial brand of activities.5 2 The language throughout section 1125
limits litigation to a specific class of Internet-based claims. 53
Furthermore, litigation under section 1125(d) of the ACPA also includes additional limitations not otherwise seen in section 1125.54 Section 1125(d)'s "bad
faith" requirement in many ways singles out particular classes of defendants:
those making a living in Cyberpiracy.55 This limitation is magnified by the exception in section 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii), which, like the individual activities listed in sections 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IV), effectively affords a rebuttable presumption of
innocent intent to individuals not making a career in Cyberpiracy.5 6 Moreover,
the presence of "bad faith" is not required in other ACPA provisions, and section
1125(c)(5) goes as far as to open additional remedies in light of willful violations.57 Thus, when considering its "commerciality" requirement and limited relief, the ACPA likely provides protections primarily for corporate websites.
-However, on its face, the ACPA is not clear about the extent of the protections it
offers for the most common forms of websites; those operated by individuals deriving little to no profit from their operation.
The statutory text most relevant to the present discussion is section 1125(d)(2)
of the ACPA, because it provides an in rem basis for jurisdiction over a domain
name.58 Much like the discussion of ACPA provisions to this point, however, a
careful review of the language demonstrates section 1125(d)(2)'s limited power.
For example, section 1125(d)(2)(C) provides that a domain name's situs, lies in
known as the Lanham Act, as Section 43(d). See Appendix A for the text of the ACPA relevant to this
discussion.
52 ACPA § 1125(d)(1)(E).
53 See generally ACPA § 1125; Appendix A infra.
54 Id.
55 In particular, ACPA §§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V)-(IX) detail the types of activities typically engaged in by Cyberpirates, whereas §§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IV) focus on activities indicating that an
individual clearly is not engaged in Cyberpiracy.
56 See supra note 55.
57 Other remedial considerations further limit the power of the ACPA. Under ACPA
§ 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii), litigants are barred from seeking relief from website registries hosting violating
domain names absent a showing of bad faith, reckless disregard, or failure to obey a court order.
Furthermore, § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) limits available relief to termination of the violating domain name,
or its being transferred to the plaintiff. Thus, the violators themselves are not liable. Although
§1125(d)(3) opens a door for additional relief, its ambiguous language (especially in light of other
subsections' specific allowances) makes its possible effectiveness and application questionable.
58 ACPA § 1125(d)(2).
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either the judicial district where the domain name registry is located or where
"documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the disposition
59
of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court."
Despite the section's potential linguistic ambiguity, courts almost unanimously
view this as a procedural mechanism, and have determined that a domain name's
situs lies only in the judicial district in which it is registered.
In her opinion for the court in Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, current Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor summarized the generally accepted reading of section 1125(d)'s in rem provision.6 0 However, this interpretation of
section 1125(d) greatly limits its application, and has two significant consequences. First, only a limited number of judicial districts house the majority of
domain name registries. For example, several of the most prominent registries are
situated in the Eastern District of Virginia. 61 As a result of this restrictive interpretation, the bulk of section 1125(d) litigation proceeds to a limited number of
jurisdictions. With the increase in Internet use, this may impose substantial bur59 ACPA § 1125(d)(2)(C).
60 310 F.3d 293, 300-01, 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe arrangement of § 1125(d)(2) separates,
conceptually and chronologically, the prescriptive jurisdiction-granting language of subsection
(d)(2)(A) from the descriptive language of legal situs in subsection (d)(2)(C). Moreover, while subsection (d)(2)(A) speaks of 'filing an in rem civil action,' subsection (d)(2)(C), which begins with the
words 'in an in rem action under this paragraph,' plainly presupposes that such an action has already
been filed in a judicial district referred to in subsection (d)(2)(A), and then proceeds to describe the
domain name's legal situs during that action. Thus, by the time we reach subsection (d)(2)(C), we are
already 'in' litigation that was commenced pursuant to subsection (d)(2)(A). Nothing on the face of
the statute suggests that a plaintiff may alter this procedural sequence . . . by filing suit in a judicial
district of its own choosing, and then attempting unilaterally to relocate the domain name's legal situs
to buttress that choice ... . [Bloth the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that in
rem jurisdiction is a preexisting fact determined by the location of the disputed domain name's registrar
or a similar authority, and that the subsequent deposit of sufficient documents with a court of appropriate jurisdiction confirms the domain name's legal situs as being in that judicial district for purposes
of the litigation . . . . [Tihe legislative history of the ACPA reveals Congress's concern to establish a
circumscribed basis for in rem jurisdiction that is grounded in the 'nexus' provided by the registrar or
other domain-name authority having custody of the disputed property. This congressional solicitude is
fully consistent with what we find to be the plain meaning of § 1125(d)(2)(A): that an in rem action
may be brought only 'in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry,
or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located.' . . . [T]he
ACPA's basic in rem jurisdictional grant, contained in subsection (d)(2)(A), contemplates exclusively
a judicial district within which the registrar or other domain-name authority is located. A plaintiff
must initiate an in rem action by filing a complaint in that judicial district and no other. Upon receiving
proper written notification that the complaint has been filed, the domain-name authority must deposit
with the court documentation 'sufficient to establish the court's' control and authority regarding the
disposition of . .. the domain name, as required by subsection (d)(2)(D). This combination of filing
and depositing rules encompasses the basic, mandatory procedure for bringing and maintaining an in
rem action under the ACPA. Subsection (d)(2)(C) contributes to this scheme by descriptively summarizing the domain name's legal situs as established and defined in the procedures set forth in subsections (d)(2)(A) and (d)(2)(D).") (emphasis added).
61 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1.
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dens on courts in those forums. Second, and perhaps more important, is the burden imposed on potential litigants. Because a domain name's situs generally is
limited to a select few judicial districts, plaintiffs and defendants often have to
appear in courtrooms outside of the jurisdictions in which they reside to vindicate
their rights.
This subsection examines only a small segment of the ACPA. However, it is
important to contemplate the potential reach of the ACPA in light of its textual
construction, 62 as compared to the narrow application applied by the courts. Such
considerations will be given further treatment in the latter portion of this article.
C.

Modern Approaches

1. General Jurisdiction and Zippo's "Sliding Scale" Test
A close examination of an early test formulated by the courts for determining
their power over non-residents' internet-based litigation coincides with the discussion of general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction is available over a non-resident defendant where he or she is "present" in the forum, has pervasive contacts
in that forum, and therefore, can justifiably be called into court regardless of
whether the pending lawsuit arises from his or her contacts there. 63 An individual
is amenable to all lawsuits brought in the state in which he or she is domiciled.64
Similarly, a corporation generally is amenable to any suit brought in its primary
place of business or the state in which it is incorporated, regardless of whether
62 See infra Appendix A.
63 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ("[T]he terms 'present' or 'presence' are
used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands may be met by such
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there.").
64 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-64 (1940) ("Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to
bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service . . . . [insofar as] the form of substituted service
provided for such cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard ..... The state which accords him privileges and affords
protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. 'Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws, are inseparable' from the various incidences of state citizenship. The responsibilities of that
citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That relationship is not
dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident
to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is
amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings
against him.") (citations omitted).
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the litigation arises from its contacts in the forum.65 Beyond these general rules,
however, the types of pervasive contacts with a forum state necessary to establish
general jurisdiction are uncommon; especially when dealing with individual defendants as opposed to business entities. Thus, this exercise of general jurisdiction
is rare. 66
Courts typically are reluctant to hold a defendant amenable to suit on the basis
of general jurisdiction, because such a finding could expose that defendant to
subsequent lawsuits brought in any other jurisdiction.6 7 A discussion of a once
65 See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (holding that "there have been instances in which the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to
justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities");
and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (reaffirming the holding in International Shoe, and further supporting its logic by reasoning that "some of the decisions holding the
corporation amenable to suit have been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its
consent to service and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state through the acts of its
authorized agents .... [blut more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a
nature as to justify the fiction") (citations omitted). But cf Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181,
1192-94 (2010) (The term "'principal place of business' is best read as referring to the place where a
corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities .... [often referred to
as] the corporation's 'nerve center' . . . . [which] in practice ... should normally be the place where the
corporation maintains its headquarters -provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the 'nerve center,' and not simply an office where the corporation
holds its board meetings." The Court held that this reading is closely aligned with the intent of 28
U.S.C. § 1332, because it provides a moderate and simplistic approach for establishing jurisdiction
over a corporation, and affords a degree of predictability beneficial to corporations and individual
plaintiffs alike.).
66 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) ("Mere
purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those
purchase transactions. Nor [does] the fact that Helicol sent personnel into Texas for training in connection with the purchase of helicopters and equipment in that State in any way enhanced the nature
of Helicol's contacts with Texas. The training was a part of the package of goods and services purchased by Helicol from Bell Helicopter. The brief presence of Helicol employees in Texas for the
purpose of attending the training sessions is no more a significant contact than were the trips to New
York made by the buyer for the retail store in Rosenberg. See also [Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84 (1978)] (basing California jurisdiction on 3-day and 1-day stopovers in that State 'would
make a mockery of' due process limitations on assertion of personal jurisdiction."). See also Submersible Sys. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) ("As commentators have
recognized, the continuous and systematic contacts test is a difficult one to meet, requiring extensive
contacts between a defendant and a forum . . . . [so much so that the] Supreme Court has upheld an
exercise of personal jurisdiction when the suit was unrelated to the defendant's contacts with a forum
only once") (citations omitted); Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999)
(declining jurisdiction because the plaintiff's "assertions [were] vague and overgeneralized .... [giving] no indication as to the extent, duration, or frequency of [the defendant's] business dealings in
Texas . . . . [and] even if taken as true, [the plaintiff's] assertions amount[ed] to little more than a
vague claim that [the defendant] conduct[ed] business in Texas .... [Therefore the defendant lacked]
the continuous and systematic contacts necessary for the exercise of general jurisdiction.").
67 For a general discussion of this possibility, see Note: No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to
the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1834 (2003), and
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popular test used to consider a court's power over non-residents in Internet-related lawsuits illustrates this possibility. The court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo DOT Com, Inc., established a "Sliding Scale" test for exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based on his or her Internet-related conduct
in the forum.68 There, the court found that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
69
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Following the decision in Zippo, the Sliding Scale test gained popularity as a means
for determining a defendant's amenability to suit based on the categorization of
his or her website within the Sliding Scale framework and the types of activities
conducted through that website.
A comparison of the language defining the nature of conduct sufficient for
exercising general jurisdiction over a defendant with that of the Sliding Scale test
identifies a clear theoretical overlap. Under the Sliding Scale test, a non-resident's contacts with a forum state can be found to be so continuous, systematic,
and substantial that the forum state's court has power over him or her in litigation unrelated to those contacts. 70 On one end are "active" websites. Active sites
are akin to large corporations that deliberately conduct business in a forum and
subsequently are deemed amenable to suit there on any ground, because they
have continued to avail themselves of the benefits and protections of the forum's
laws. 7 ' At the lower end of the Sliding Scale are "passive" websites, which are
Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16
BERKELEY TEcii. L.J. 1345, 1370 (2001). Also compare Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suggesting that even if a website provides contacts normally satisfying a
general jurisdiction analysis, due process protections impose a significant barrier, because allowing
jurisdiction on these grounds may result in website owners being amenable to jurisdiction wherever
the website is accessible), with Inset Sys. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996),
supra text on page 8.
68 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
69 Id. at 1123-24.
70 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952); see also Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.1 1 (1984) (The Court clarified its holding in Perkins by making the
distinction with the case at bar that "[t]he defendant corporation's contacts with the forum State in
Perkins were more substantial than those of respondent with New Hampshire in this case. In Perkins,
the corporation's mining operations, located in the Philippine Islands, were completely halted during
the Japanese occupation. The president, who was also general manager and principal stockholder of
the company, returned to his home in Ohio where he carried on 'a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.' The company's files were kept in
Ohio, several directors' meetings were held there, substantial accounts were maintained in Ohio
banks, and all key business decisions were made in the State. In those circumstances, Ohio was the
corporation's principal, if temporary, place of business so that Ohio jurisdiction was proper even over
a cause of action unrelated to the activities in the State.") (citations omitted).
71 But see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. at 1192-94. Given the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the author recognizes that the above statement may soon become an
outdated view. See also BNA, Jurisdictionand Procedure:High Court Endorses 'Nerve Center' Test for
Corporate Citizenship in Diversity Cases, 42 SEC. REG. & L. Rev. 342 (2010).
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insufficient for establishing jurisdiction over a non-resident. The logic for declining jurisdiction under these circumstances mirrors that used by courts rejecting a
"stream of commerce" justification in typical general jurisdiction cases. 72 Between these extremes are "interactive" websites, and jurisdiction based on the
operation of these sites will depend on the surrounding facts and circumstances of
each case.
Despite its overlap with the analysis of general jurisdiction, the Sliding Scale
test often was used to determine a defendant's amenability to specific jurisdiction.74 Moreover, courts have not always embraced its application in the general
jurisdiction context.7 5 Thus, concerns that broad exercises of general jurisdiction
72 See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 274-75 (Cal. 2002) (Affirming previous
holdings that "'[c]reating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide -or even worldwide- but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the
forum state."' Otherwise, 'personal jurisdiction in Internet-related cases would almost always be
found in any forum in the country' ..... Such a result would 'vitiate long-held and inviolate principles
of' personal jurisdiction.") (citations omitted). See also Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370,
375 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the "conclusion that there is a stream of commerce ensures that the
contact that caused harm in the forum occurred there through the defendant's conduct and not the
plaintiff's unilateral activities; it does not ensure that defendant's relationship with the forum is continuous and systematic, such that it can be sued there for unrelated claims"); Purdue Research Found.
v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding the defendant's "reliance on the
stream of commerce theory is misplaced because that theory is relevant only to the exercise of specific
jurisdiction; it provides no basis for exercising general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant").
73 See also Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) ("At the one end of the
spectrum, there are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet by entering
into contracts with residents of other states which 'involve the knowing and repeated transmission of
computer files over the Internet . . . .' In this situation [the website is considered active or commercial,
and] personal jurisdiction is proper. At the other end of the spectrum, there are situations where a
defendant merely establishes a passive website that does nothing more than advertise on the Internet.
With passive websites, personal jurisdiction is not appropriate. In the middle of the spectrum, there
are situations where a defendant has a website that allows a user to exchange information with a host
computer. In this middle ground, 'the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on [these interactive] Website[s]."') (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
74 In fact, Zippo was a specific jurisdiction case, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("We are being asked to determine whether Dot Com's conducting of electronic commerce with Pennsylvania residents constitutes the purposeful availment of
doing business in Pennsylvania. . . . [and we] conclude that it does."). However, courts also used the
Sliding Scale test when evaluating general jurisdiction, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333,
336 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting Zippo's Sliding Scale test in the 5th Circuit in the context of a general
jurisdiction analysis, but declining to exercise jurisdiction based on the defendant's website).
75 The confusion arising from Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19737
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2001), and a sequence of subsequent decisions on appeal illustrates this point. On
appeal from the District Court's dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction, the 9th Circuit determined
that L.L. Bean in fact had established a continuous and systematic presence in California. The court
reasoned that "fu]nder the sliding-scale analysis, L.L. Bean's contacts with California are sufficient to
confer general jurisdiction. L.L. Bean's website is highly interactive and very extensive: L.L. Bean
'clearly does business over the Internet.' Moreover, millions of dollars in sales, driven by an extensive,
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would expose non-resident defendants to unpredictable and potentially unrestricted personal jurisdiction, and over the difficulty in consistently applying the
Sliding Scale test, gave rise to other approaches. However, when conduct in a
forum is more substantial, continuous, and systematic, the test may retain value
as a means for establishing general jurisdiction over websites and defendants.
2.

Specific Jurisdiction and Calder's "Effects" Test

A closer look at another test used by the courts for determining their power
over a non-resident defendant in internet-based disputes aligns with the discussion of specific jurisdiction. Courts generally hale non-residents into a foreign
courtroom by exercising their power of specific jurisdiction. "Specific jurisdiction
is only appropriate when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum
state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action." 76 It is unquestioned that a single act is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, insofar as that
77
single act gives rise to the pending lawsuit.

ongoing, and sophisticated sales effort involving very large numbers of direct email solicitations and
millions of catalog sales, qualifies as 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic' commercial activity
. . . . The District Court erred in concluding that there was no general jurisdiction in this case."
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). But it did
not end there. After yet another appeal, the 9th Circuit once more had an opportunity to view the
facts, and summarized the events leading up to their once more hearing the case, and the uncertain
state of the law. "We vacated the decision of the three-judge panel when we took the appeal en banc,
but the panel decision is in the Federal Reporter for anyone to read. That decision no longer has the
force of law, but it is a clear statement by three judges of this court that, in their view, there is general
jurisdiction over L.L. Bean in California . . . . The disarray in our case law is patent. How else to
explain such dramatically different holdings from our judges -one judge dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and three judges holding that there is general jurisdiction? It is not only the litigants in this case
that would benefit from an en banc opinion in this appeal. All potential litigants in this circuit would
benefit." Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). See also Silverstein v. E360 Insight, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57695, *7-8 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
6, 2007).
76 Global 360, Inc. v. Spittin' Image Software, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1857-L, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4092, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2005).
77 See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ("'Presence' in the state in this
sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or
authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given."); Burnham v. Superior Court
of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (interpreting Int'l Shoe as suggesting "the defendant's litigationrelated 'minimum contacts' may take the place of physical presence as the basis for jurisdiction.");
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) ("It is sufficient for purposes of due process that
the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State."); Lewis v. Fresne,
252 F.3d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[a] single act by a defendant can be enough to
confer personal jurisdiction if that act gives rise to the claim being asserted").
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Following the Supreme Court's decision in Calder v. Jones, a new wrinkle was
added to the "single act is enough" rule. 78 The Court upheld California's jurisdiction over the defendants, Calder and South, holding that the story they published
"concerned the California activities of a California resident . . . whose television
79
Because "the brunt of . . . respondent's
career was centered in California."

emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in
California," the court viewed California as "the focal point both of the story and
of the harm suffered. . . . [therefore making jurisdiction] over petitioners . . .
proper in California based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California."80 The Court was, however, careful in defining the reach of this "effectsbased" doctrine, stating that Calder's and South's "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California.. . . [a]nd they knew that the
brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she live[d]
81
and work[ed] and in which the[ir] [employer] ha[d] its largest circulation."
Given the totality of the circumstances, therefore, Calder and South "must 'reasonably [have anticipated] being haled into court there' to answer for the truth of
the statements made in their article." 82
In the aftermath of Calder, courts across the country began utilizing the "Effects" test. 83 Before long, the logic extended beyond its initial use in libel cases,
78 465 U.S. 783 (1984). And even if it is argued that the Effects test was not a novel approach by
the time Calder reached the Supreme Court, there is no denying that it achieved its current prominence as a result of the Court's endorsement.
79 Id. at 789.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 789-790.
82 Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
83 See, e.g., Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999) (The court cites a
number of helpful sources on the Effects doctrine in the context of intentional torts, as well as its
roots in Calder,stating that "[w]hen a nonresident defendant commits a tort within the state, or an act
outside the state that causes tortious injury within the state, that tortious conduct amounts to sufficient minimum contacts with the state by the defendant to constitutionally permit courts within that
state, including federal courts, to exercise personal adjudicative jurisdiction over the tortfeasor and
the causes of actions arising from its offenses or quasi-offenses. See, e.g., Jobe v. ATR Mktg., Inc., 87
F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Myers & Assocs., Ltd., 41 F.3d 229, 231 (5th Cir.
1995); Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990); D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle
Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 1985); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d
1260, 1270-71 (5th Cir. 1983); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 1983); Simon
v. United States, 644 F.2d 490, 499 (5th Cir. 1981); Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745, 748 (5th
Cir. 1977); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1973), abrogated on
other grounds by United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960 (5th Cir. 1998); Elkhart Eng'g. Corp. v.
Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1965); Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 256-57 (5th
Cir. 1962); see 4 Wright & Miller, § 1069; Willis L. M. Reese & Nina M. Galston, Doing an Act or
Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. Rav. 249 (1959). Even an act
done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will suffice as a basis for
jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were
intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant's conduct. See Calder, 465 U.S. at
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moving into other intentional torts, business torts,84 and eventually, the Effects
test was applied by courts seeking jurisdiction over non-residents whose internetrelated contacts allegedly caused harm to plaintiff's in the forum. "[W]hen an
entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper. Different results
should not be reached simply because business is conducted over the Internet."85
The courts routinely have held that although a physical presence in the forum
may solidify a court's power over him or her, "[j]urisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically
enter the forum State. . . . [and insofar as] efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State . . . absence of physical contacts [cannot] defeat

personal jurisdiction there." 8 6 Given the previously noted inconsistency in the
application of the Sliding Scale test, and continuing uncertainty about the best
method for determining jurisdiction in internet-based litigation, Calder's Effects
test quickly became the standard.87
789-90; Bullion, 895 F.2d at 217; Brown, 688 F.2d at 333; Simon, 644 F.2d at 499; see 4 Wright &
Miller, § 1069.").
84 See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 269 (Cal. 2002).
85 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (citations
omitted).
86 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (discussing jurisdiction over "commercial actors," but this reasoning has readily been applied over businesses and individuals alike).
87 See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 264 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
when viewed as a whole, website postings by Connecticut newspapers about a prison in Virginia were
not sufficient for establishing jurisdiction, because "the newspapers' websites, as well as the articles in
question, were aimed at a Connecticut audience. The newspapers did not post materials on the Internet with the manifest intent of targeting Virginia readers. Accordingly, the newspapers could not
have 'reasonably anticipated being haled into court [in Virginia] to answer for the truth of the statements made in their articles"') (citation omitted); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960
F.Supp. 456, 470 (D.Mass. 1997) (dismissing defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, because by posting a website infringing on the plaintiff's trademark, they "like the petitioners
in Calder,should have anticipated being haled into a Massachusetts court to answer for [their] acts");
Illustro Sys. Int'l, LLC v. IBM, No. 3:06-CV-1969-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33324, at *29-31 (N.D.
Tex. May 4, 2007) (concluding that copyright infringement is an intentional tort, and noting the utility
of Calder's "Effects" test for determining the amenability of jurisdiction in such cases); Goldhaber v.
Kohlenberg, 395 N.J. Super. 380, 389-390, 928 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2007) (holding the
defendant's internet postings were sufficient to establish jurisdiction, due to their targeted and specific
language toward plaintiffs, who were forum residents); Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692,
699, 702 (E.D. Va. 1999) (The court extended a broad jurisdictional reach, holding that "a prima facie
showing of a sufficient act by the La Fontaines in Virginia follows from their use of the AOL account,
a Virginia-based service, to publish the allegedly defamatory statements. According to Bochan's expert, because the postings were accomplished through defendant's AOL account, they were transmitted first to AOL's USENET server hardware, located in Loudon County, Virginia. There, the
message was apparently both stored temporarily and transmitted to other USENET servers around
the world. Thus, as to the La Fontaines, because publication is a required element of defamation, and
a prima facie showing has been made that the use of USENET server in Virginia was integral to that
publication, there is a sufficient act in Virginia to satisfy [statutory requirements]," and that "[u]nder
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Despite the value of Calder's Effects test, one requirement poses significant
barriers when evaluating the propriety of specific personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant. "[VJirtually every jurisdiction has held that the Calder
effects test requires intentional conduct expressly aimed at or targeting the forum
state in addition to the defendant's knowledge that his intentional conduct would
cause harm in the forum."" This requirement likewise has been required in Internet cases, but is ill-equipped for responding to the factual underpinnings of
such cases. 89
In the context of internet-related lawsuits, it may be difficult to establish the
type of expressly aimed conduct necessary for satisfying Calder. Although a nonresident may know who their conduct effects, or the website their acts are directed toward, proving that they expressly aim their conduct at a forum may be
problematic. This is because while the internet facilitates the modem functional
equivalent of physical interaction, it does not necessarily facilitate the type of
tangible relationship with a forum and its residents that is inherently linked to
their physical presence.
Where the Effects test in some ways embodies the topic of sharp divide in the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court
of California, many have argued that this intent requirement now is an accepted
part of all specific jurisdiction analyses.90 Thus, however restrictive Calder's "express aiming" requirement may be, in many respects, it does not impose new
[the] circumstances, because the predominant 'effects' of the La Fontaines' and Harris's conduct are
in Virginia, these defendants could reasonably foresee being haled into court in this jurisdiction.").
See also Jason W. Callen, Asserting In Personam Jurisdictionover Foreign Cybersquatters,69 U. Ci ii.
L. REv. 1837, 1839-40 (2002) (The author maintains that a combination of the "Effects" test and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) is superior to 28 U.S.C. § 1125(d), because "[w]hen cybersquatters . . . register
trademark-infringing domain names and engage in activities that tarnish the value of the mark, they
intentionally injure mark owners in the United States. Cybersquatters establish minimum contacts
with the nation as a whole because mark owners suffer harm in the United States. Based on these
nationwide contacts, federal courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction under Fed R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2).").
88 Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 271 (Cal. 2002); see also IMO Indus. v. Kiekert
AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]e reject Janmark and agree with the conclusion reached by
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that jurisdiction under Calder requires more
than a finding that the harm caused by the defendant's intentional tort is primarily felt within the
forum. Moreover, we agree with the Far West, Southmark, and Esab Group decisions that the Calder
'effects test' can only be satisfied if the plaintiff can point to contacts which demonstrate that the
defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the forum, and thereby made the forum the focal
point of the tortious activity. Simply asserting that the defendant knew that the plaintiffs principal
place of business was located in the forum would be insufficient in itself to meet this requirement. The
defendant must 'manifest behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on' the forum for Calder to
be satisfied. In the typical case, this will require some type of 'entry' into the forum state by the
defendant.") (citations omitted).
89 See, e.g., Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262 (2002).
90 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See generally Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem
of PersonalJurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARv. L. Rv. 1821, 1834 (2003) (discussing that al-
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barriers for establishing jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. Nevertheless,
Internet-based contacts may not allow for direct proof of the specific intent likely
necessary to justify haling a non-resident defendant into a foreign court. This is
where the Effects test begins to weaken. But, much like the Sliding Scale test, it
would remain useful under the proper circumstances.
3.

Summary

In response to a flood of Internet-related litigation, the courts initially struggled to analyze the suitability of jurisdiction within the existing personal jurisdiction framework. Two tests emerged from this early period of litigation that
survive to this day: Zippo's Sliding Scale test, and Calder's Effects test. Although
courts often apply one or both of these tests to determine whether a non-resident's contacts are sufficient to confer jurisdiction,91 both approaches have their
drawbacks.
Under the Effects test, jurisdiction rarely is exercised absent a defendant's
"expressly aiming" their conduct at the forum state. As the court in Paviovich v.
Superior Court held, "knowledge alone is insufficient to establish express aiming
at the forum state as required by the effects test." 92 In many ways, then, this
requirement serves the same purpose as the graduated website classification
scheme in the Zippo test, because both are intended to add a degree of predictthough there appears to be an "intent" requirement inherent in the purposeful availment analysis,
courts generally have set a low standard for satisfying it).
91 TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of PersonalJurisdictionBased on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TicII. L.J. 519 (2004).
92 29 Cal. 4th 262, 278 (Cal. 2002). It is notable that the dissenting opinion, although relaxing
the requirement that the defendant expressly aim their conduct at a known person or place, still
required express aiming at the forum, stating that "it cannot matter that defendant may not have
known or cared about the exact identities or precise locations of each individual target, or that he
happened to employ a so-called passive Internet Web site, or whether any California resident visited
the site. By acting with the broad intent to harm industries he knew were centered or substantially
present in this state, defendant forged sufficient 'minimum contacts' with California 'that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court [here].'" Id. at 279 (citations omitted). The dissenting
judges went on to state that "the intended injurious effects of posting DeCSS were aimed directly at
the computer hardware industry involved in producing CSS-encrypted DVD players -an industry Paylovich knew was heavily concentrated in California . ... Moreover, Pavlovich knew the purpose of
CSS was to protect copyrighted movies from pirating, and . . . [t]hus, even if he did not personally
pirate copyrighted material for commercial gain, Pavlovich ... took an action calculated to harm the
movie industry, which [he] knew was centered in California." Id. at 288. The dissent concluded by
stating that "defendants who aim conduct at particular jurisdictions, expecting and intending that
injurious effects will be felt in those specific places, cannot shield themselves from suit there simply by
using the Internet, or some other generalized medium of communication, as the means of inflicting
the harm." Id. at 289 (citations omitted). "[Tihe unusual and unprecedented facts of this case demonstrate purposeful activity directed toward this forum sufficient to establish minimum contacts under
the Calder test. As a result of his actions, defendant Pavlovich should reasonably have anticipated
being haled into court in this state, and recognition of California's jurisdiction thus meets constitutional standards of fairness." Id. at 294.
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ability to Internet-related activity that will support personal jurisdiction, but just
as importantly, institute a stringent standard that prevents all Internet users (and
in particular website operators) from being exposed to litigation in all forums.
The concerns of the majority in Pavlovich9 3 can be summarized as follows:
[If] the mere posting of information on a [website], which is accessible from
anywhere but is directed at no particular audience, [is deemed] an action
targeted at a particular forum ... mere use of the Internet would subject the
user to personal jurisdiction in any forum where the site was accessible.94
Unfortunately, internet users typically do not have actual and specific knowledge of the where or to whom their conduct is directed. Certainly, interactions
among friends and acquaintances via the Internet generally involve the type of
"express aiming" required by Paviovich. But what of the millions of business interactions, or blog posts, or the various other activities that previously required
physical presence or interaction, but now are achievable through the Internet
with the click of a button?
Somewhere in between the restrictive view incorporated in modern legal approaches, and the potential for nightmarish and unconstitutional outcomes predicted by countless judges, lies a more suitable framework for determining
personal jurisdiction in the Internet age. The following section explores several
possible alternatives.

IV.

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES REQUIRE

NEw

APPROACHES TO THE

PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS

Internet-related conduct facilitates interactions that modern legal approaches
do not adequately consider. It is almost beyond dispute that the Internet facilitates the modern functional equivalent of the physical presence in a forum that is
necessary for a court to exercise its power. Courts continue to explore the boundaries of their power in Internet-related litigation. 95 However, the law has yet to
93 Author's note: the quoted language is from the dissenting opinion and is not intended to
reflect the dissent's agreement with the majority's view of potential outcomes, but rather, was the
dissent's well-stated summary of the majority's position.
94 Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 262, 289.
95 See, e.g., Molly McDonough, Indiana High Court Allows MySpace Entry as Evidence in Murder Trial, ABA JOURNAL: LAW NEws Now, Oct. 16, 2009 (discussing the Indiana Supreme Court's
recent upholding of a conviction in which comments made on a defendant's MySpace page were used
as character evidence, and quoting a Fort Wayne Journal Gazette interview with Valparaiso University's Bruce Berner, who commented on the decision's consistency in terms of established law, despite
the difference in forum ("this guy spouts off on a MySpace page instead of to a guy at a bar .... The
format is different . . . , but other than that, this is classic prosecution rebutting a defendant who put
his own character at issue.")); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 09 C 1385 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009) (dismissing a
claim against Craigslist.com on the grounds that the lawsuit brought was preempted by 47 U.S.C.
§ 230); Bosh v. Zavala (08-CV-04851-FMC-MANx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (touching on the concept of Cybersquatting discussed in Section Ill.B supra, the court allowed basketball star Chris Bosh
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fully acknowledge the influence of the Internet in everyday life, often resulting in
less-than-adequate outcomes in light of concerns for fair play and substantial
justice.
Yet this is not the first instance of the law encountering conflicts between
emerging legal issues and long-held procedural practices. The following presents
several innovations that would allow courts to more effectively, efficiently, and
fairly adjudicate Internet-related disputes. Although these ideas are offered
merely as a starting point for a more substantive discussion on the relevant issues,
each is firmly rooted in the logic of traditional jurisdictional analyses, and is supported by the broader philosophical underpinnings of the courts' methods for
handling Internet litigation to date.
A.

Statutes

Under the ACPA, Congress effectively established a website as a form of
property, designated its legal situs in the jurisdiction in which its domain name
registry is located, and made an allowance for plaintiffs to bring in rem proceedings in that locale. One method for adapting the personal jurisdiction analysis to
modern realities would be a wide-scale implementation of the ACPA approach.
The court in Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com,adequately captured the
power of statutes in reshaping jurisdictional frameworks: "There is no prohibition
on a legislative body making something property. Even if a domain name is no
more than data, Congress can make data property and assign its place of registration as its situs."96
The first determination to make under an ACPA-like approach is the proper
situs of the Internet property, because absent careful planning, outcomes would
be no better than those occurring under existing approaches. One option is to
uniformly apply the ACPA's logic, and to entertain all disputes arising from webrelated contacts in the jurisdiction where the domain name's registry is located.
97
However, this likely would pose an undue burden on a select few jurisdictions.
A more novel, albeit controversial approach would be to "localize" the website's situs.98 Much like the Internet facilitates the modern functional equivalent
to seize various domain names held by the defendant) (for more on Bosh and other recent cases
bringing about the question of whether domain names can be used to satisfy creditor judgments, see
Eric Goldman, Domain Names as Property Subject to Creditor Claims -Bosh v. Zavala, TECI. &
MARKETING LAW BLoo, Oct. 21, 2009); CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, 2009 WL 841132 (D. Md.
March 31, 2009) (holding that jurisdiction was proper over defendants who used plaintiff's online
databases without authorization, because they likely would have seen the terms of service, and the
choice of forum clause therein, during the several years they accessed the site).
96 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000) (emphasis added).
97 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1.
98 This approach is, however, consistent with existing methods. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(2010) (providing venue both where jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity, as well as where jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
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of physical contact and interaction, it likewise gives rise to the modern functional
equivalent of physical possession. In a theoretical sense, a website is just as much
a personal possession as a diary, a work of art, or any other individual creation.
Unlike these tangible possessions, however, attaining actual physical possession
of Internet property is not as easy to conceptualize. One may print the display of
their home page and put it in their pocket, but would this qualify as possession?
Put another way, if someone took that piece of paper, would they now have possession of the website? Do individuals possess the website simply because they
are looking at it on their home computer screen, while they act as the site administrator and upload information and alter content?
With a moment of thought, the disconnect is easy to understand. Despite having all of the characteristics of personal property, a website falls short of achieving traditional standards simply by virtue of the medium in which it exists;
cyberspace. Thus, as we accept the idea that the Internet allows contact with
others in a way previously unavailable, so too must we recognize that it allows for
property ownership, and thus property rights, in much the same fashion.9 9 If this
logic is accepted, a website's situs quickly can become more localized than provided under statutes like the ACPA. It could be the jurisdiction in which the
website's owner or operator lives. Just as appropriately, it could be deemed the
jurisdiction in which its Internet service provider is located. Whatever the determination, the burdens of litigation would be more equally spread across courtor omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantialpart of the property that is the subject of
the action is situated") (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. e
(1982) ("The connection classically sufficient to found jurisdiction to determine interests in a thing is
the presence of the thing within the state . . . . This limitation may still have some validity.. .. [but

under modem views] it is relevant to consider not merely the physical location of the property [in
determining jurisdiction over it], but the apparatus of providing a remedy with respect to it . . . . A
more difficult problem arises in determining the relationship between the forum state and intangible
property. Two questions arise. The first is the identity of the thing that is the subject of adjudication.
If, for example, a debt evidenced by a writing is involved, the 'thing' at issue may be conceived as the
writing or as the debt that it evidences. Whether the thing is found to be present depends on which of
these conceptions is adopted. The second question is whether the thing, whatever it is, is situated
within the forum state. Traditionally, the question of location was formulated and answered in terms
of physical presence, an approach that inevitably involves legal fiction when intangible property is
involved. In some instances, situs may be defined by statute. Modern decisional law has tended to
ascribe location of an intangible by inquiring whether the state has significant relationships to the
transaction giving rise to the property claims in dispute. Thus, essentially a test of minimum contacts is
used for determining whether the property may be subjected to adjudication.")(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
99 The Author thanks an anonymous Law Review Editor who presented the following artful
example conveying this point: Joe leases a fractional T1 from a local provider, connects it to his home
computer, registers a domain name to the corresponding IP address, and run an HTTP server on his
home computer with an HTTP root directory on Joe's local hard drive. All of the data is stored on a
hard disk owned and controlled by Joe, Under these facts, the website likely is not distinguishable
from a handwritten diary. Thus, the website likely is property that Joe possesses.

REVISING THE ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

183

rooms, and jurisdiction would be established in a fashion much closer to
traditional frameworks, rather than imposing the mutual inconvenience of litigating in foreign courtrooms on both plaintiffs and defendants, as is the case under
the ACPA.
However, this approach is not without its pitfalls. First, this framework generally would only apply to litigation arising from some form of website-related dispute. Thus, the various other forms of Internet-related disputes, including suits
arising from Internet-based breaches of contract, Internet-related business transactions, Internet-based tort claims, and so on, do not fit neatly within this framework. More important, potentially significant concerns arise in terms of
constitutional due process when non-residents suddenly are being haled into foreign courtrooms in a manner the courts have been so careful to prevent. These
concerns do not altogether destroy the viability of a statutory approach to modernizing jurisdictional analyses, but they do make an examination of additional
alternatives worthwhile.
B.

Expanding the Use of in rem Jurisdiction

This subsection expands on the notion presented above that the Internet gives
rise to the modern functional equivalent of property possession. From the onset,
it bears repeating that a valid exercise of in rem jurisdiction requires that the
property in question be related to the pending lawsuit, and that the appropriateness of jurisdiction be evaluated according to the two-pronged test originally set
100
forth in InternationalShoe.
To utilize in rem jurisdiction in Internet-related disputes in a meaningful way,
two propositions must be accepted. First, Internet-based proprietary rights must
be acknowledged as valid and enforceable. This notion is most readily acceptable
when considering websites as personal possessions, but a similar line of logic extends to written works, software, and any other property-like interests that normally are connected with physical possession, but now extend into cyberspace in
the form Internet-based equivalents of property. Such recognition is consistent
with the widely accepted view that stocks, trademarks, and other intangible interests are to be afforded rights consistent with those enjoyed by the holders of real
or personal property. 10 ' Second, the most efficient means of conducting in rem
proceedings would be to hale a non-resident defendant into the forum where the
property is located. This requires acceptance of in rem jurisdiction as a "twoway" concept.
The Supreme Court decisions examining whether property is a valid basis for
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant suggest that in rem jurisdiction is a
100 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
101 See generally RESTATEMI-ENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 6 (1982). In particular, the reporter notes are helpful in navigating the evolution of the law in this area.
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viable alternative in the context of Internet-based disputes. Furthermore, they
suggest that in rem jurisdiction may be appropriate even when the defendant
does not own property in the forum. In both McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., and Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court gives considerable attention to equity,
and to the interests of states and plaintiffs.102 McGee cited the forum's "manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents" as a basis for in
rem jurisdiction, and stated that resident plaintiffs "would be at a severe disadvantage if . .. forced to follow [defendants] to a distant State in order to hold
[him or her] legally accountable." 0 3 In Shaffer, the Court stated that the presence of property provides the contact between the forum, the defendant, and the
litigation necessary for a state to exercise its power over a non-resident, insofar as
the property is related to the instant claim.' 04 Furthermore, Shaffer cites as reasons for subjecting a defendant to in rem jurisdiction the availability of resources
to conduct efficient litigation, and the benefits of the forum that the defendant
implicitly receives through his or her connection with the property in that forum.10 5 The Court further held that "when claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy ... it would be unusual for the State where
the property is located not to have jurisdiction."1 06 Finally, viewing in rem jurisdiction as a two-way concept is consistent with the underlying intent in the lineage of case from Pennoyer, to International Shoe, and to Shaffer. 07 In other
words, in rem jurisdiction should be viewed as a basis for establishing jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant, regardless of whether he or she owns property in
the forum state, or merely benefits from a resident plaintiff's property ownership
in the forum.
The connection that property forms between a forum, a defendant, and the
litigation in cases where a non-resident defendant derives benefits from a forum
plaintiff's property likely are just as strong as it is when the non-resident defendant him or herself owns property there. 0 8 This connection establishes the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state, and in doing so satisfies the first
prong of the International Shoe test, because the non-owner reasonably should
believe that any grievance or injury arising from his or her relationship with the
102 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
103 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
104 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
105 Id. at 207-208.
106 Id. at 208.
107 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 21, 28, 34.
108 See Smith v. Lanier, 998 S.W.2d 324, 331 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that, regardless of residency, "a state [probate] court maintains in rem jurisdiction over property located within the state
that gives rise to the cause of action"); State v. Approximately $2,000,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 822
S.W.2d 721, 726 (Tex. App. 1991) (ruling that "if the res is released accidently [sic], fraudulently, or
improperly, the court will not be divested of its jurisdiction").
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property will expose him or her to liability in the state where it is located. In
litigation over the rights to or injuries arising out of Internet-based property, any
judgment would directly determine the parties' rights to such property. A court's
exercising its power over such disputes would be consistent with traditional
grants of personal jurisdiction, because the Internet property would be the subject of the litigation. Thus, haling a non-resident defendant into a foreign court on
the basis of in rem jurisdiction remains true to the meaning of the term, 109 and is
consistent with long-held due process requirements." 0
Nevertheless, potential concerns arise when considering these suggested approaches in light of the second prong of the InternationalShoe test. Would haling
a non-resident defendant into a foreign jurisdiction comport with constitutional
due process, where it is quite possible he or she previously is unaware of the
forum in which his or her conduct is felt? Does a forum have a substantial interest in determining a dispute where Internet-based property rightly could be
viewed as something closer to a legal fiction than other more tangible property
interests? A systemic innovation proposed in the last subsection could adequately
address such justifiable concerns.
C.

Reexamining Accepted Approaches

The courts and the law have established a series of self-imposed restraints
when dealing with Internet-related litigation, likely to prevent the inevitable fallout from too loose an application of traditional personal jurisdiction analyses."
However, such responses undervalue the prominent role of the Internet in everyday life, and do not accurately reflect the character of the Internet-based activi109 See supra text accompanying note 40; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
110 A third alternative may prove useful if one is not willing to view in rem jurisdiction in the
manner presented above, but still requires the initial acknowledgment of Internet-based property
rights. In rem jurisdiction generally is divided into three categories. See supra text accompanying note
36. If the defendant's conduct can be classified as a claim of an "unlawful" or "adverse" interest in the
resident-plaintiff's Internet-based property, in rem jurisdiction is justifiable under both the quasi in
rem type I and the quasi in rem type II approaches. First, the "two-way" in rem argument presented
above becomes unnecessary, because the non-resident, by way of this legal fiction, does actually own
Internet-based property in the forum; albeit the ownership interest is a negative one. Thus, a court's
exercise of power falls nearly in line with the standard application of in rem jurisdiction. Under type 1,
the plaintiff could be viewed as essentially "quieting the title" to their Internet property. Under type
11, the plaintiff would concede ownership of the "unlawful" portion of the Internet-based property
that the non-resident defendant creates by way of their conduct (as the Court suggests in Shaffer),
would bring an action based on the "injury" incurred to that portion of their Internet property, and
would then seek to re-establish full and uninterrupted ownership of the Internet-based property.
Once in rem jurisdiction is established in this manner, the plaintiff also may have grounds to seek
other in personam relief under another "two-way" application. See, e.g., Garfein v. McInnis, 162 N.E.
73, 74 (N.Y. 1928); see also Buzzell v. Edward H. Everett Co., 180 F.Supp. 893, 902 (D. Vt. 1960).
111 See, e.g., Mark C. Dearing,PersonalJurisdiction and the Internet: Can the TraditionalPrinciples and Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System into the 21st Century?, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL', 9 10
(Spring 1999).
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ties that give rise to litigation. This is not to suggest that existing approaches must
be completely abandoned. Instead, they simply require a renewed focus and
slight retooling to accommodate the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the Internet Age.
First, the Zippo and Calder tests should be modified to better determine the
appropriateness of personal jurisdiction in Internet-related litigation. Zippo arose
out of business-related Internet conduct." 2 Moreover, its language clearly resembles the concept of "continuous and systematic" presence that serves as the foundation for general personal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant
to exercise general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, and have applied
the Sliding Scale test cautiously to protect Internet users and website owners
from being haled into court in any jurisdiction in which Internet access is
available.
However, this article argues that the Internet facilitates the modern functional
equivalent of actual, physical presence in a forum, and that non-residents now are
equipped to engage in activities in foreign jurisdictions at their leisure, and without leaving their homes. As the court in L. L. Bean recognized, for example, there
is little difference between an online store and a store physically located in a
forum.' 13 And with the growth of forums like eBay and Craigslist, this commercial thrust likely will continue.
When combined with "doing business" long-arm statutes," 4 the Sliding Scale
test provides an ideal mechanism for establishing general personal jurisdiction
over non-residents based on their business activities or other such pervasive Internet-related contacts in a forum. Under this approach, one level of analysis
examines the interactivity of the website, and the other level whether the nonresident "does business" in the forum. Thus, general personal jurisdiction only
would be exercised over those realistically engaged in cyber commerce, and who
should foresee being haled into a foreign court as a result of their Internet-based
activities. This framework would be more responsive to the realities of the Internet, and more suitable for dealing with the growing number of individuals engaging in "e-commerce."
112 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("[T]he
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.").
113 Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 21; see also Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[New York's long arm statute] states that a New York court 'may
exercise jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore' . ...
Pursuant to [the statute], a foreign corporation will be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York if
it is present or 'doing business' in the state. A corporation's activity rises to the level of 'doing business' only when it is engaged in 'such a continuous and systematic course of activity that it can be
deemed present in the state of New York."') (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Calder's Effects test likewise warrants closer scrutiny. The Effects test mandates "express aiming" at a forum, such that only the most intentional and directed Internet-related conduct will give rise to litigation in the plaintiff's home
state. On the one hand, this requirement prevents all Internet users from being
subjected to broad sweeping jurisdiction.115 On the other hand, it prevents the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases where Internet-based activities represent
the modern functional equivalent of actual physical presence in a forum. Thus,
the Effects test should be reexamined, because it does not fully reflect the realities of Internet use, and because it does not take into account the types of interactions facilitated through this medium.
Several alternatives are available for modifying the Effects test in light of modern technological advances. One is to relax the first prong of the International
Shoe test in Internet cases.116 Non-residents making contact with a foreign jurisdiction via the Internet may not know specifically where the effects of their conduct will be felt. However, it is reasonable for them to foresee being haled into
court as a result of their modern functional equivalent of directed physical contact in whatever jurisdiction the brunt of any harm is felt. While this method may
not appeal to some, perhaps this is the unfortunate reality for dealing with litigation in the Internet Age. Moreover, steps can be taken to better inform Internet
users of where their conduct is directed; or possibly to remove a defense of ignorance. For example, "jurisdictional identifiers" with the name or an abbreviation
of the situs or primary place of operation for a website could be added to existing
domain names, as currently is seen when visiting internationally-based websites." 7 Other possibilities include user agreements, built-in forum selection
clauses, and other such notice devices.
115 See supra text accompanying note 72. See also Corrected Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee, Internet Solutions Corp. v. Tabatha Marshall (Fla. July 29, 2009) (SC09272), 2009 FL S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 714, at *6 ("As nearly every court to have considered the question
has held, a website owner who refers to a company on a website that is equally accessible in all states
cannot reasonably expect to face jurisdiction in every state where that website can be viewed. Accordingly, in determining whether jurisdiction is proper, courts look to whether a website specifically
targets forum residents and whether the site is commercially interactive .... 'To hold otherwise would
subject millions of internet users to suit in the state of any company whose trademarked name they
happen to mention on a website.'") (citations omitted).
116 See Andrew J. Grotto, Due Processand In Rem JurisdictionUnder the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 2 CoituM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (2001) (The author proposes "a
relaxed minimum contacts standard for in rem jurisdiction as it applies narrowly to the ACPA, primarily on the basis of a pair of procedural safeguards contained in the in rem provisions .... [and further
maintains that] additional contacts supplied by certain indicia of bad faith further support the constitutionality of the provisions.") (emphasis added).
117 For example, websites based in Italy typically include "it" at the end of their web addresses.
Under the suggested approach, existing postal codes or other like identifiers could be added to web
addresses to notify the user of the website's recognized situs.
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The most appropriate way to modify Calder's brand of the Effects test, however, would be to incorporate the rationales of two other Supreme Court cases:
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc..' 18 Rather
than requiring "express aiming" at a forum, blending the aforementioned cases
would accommodate jurisdiction: 1) regardless of a non-resident's physical presence in the forum (and thus would recognize Internet-based activities' role in
facilitating the modern functional equivalent of physical entry into a forum); and
2) simply by virtue of the non-resident engaging in activity that will cause harm
somewhere, no matter "where that where may be." 11 9
CONCLUSION

Internet-based contacts can provide a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction
in a manner consistent with the requirements of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.120 However, existing jurisdictional frameworks do not reflect the realities
118 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
119 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475-76 & n.18 ("[The] 'purposeful availment' requirement
ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,'
or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another party or a third person.' Jurisdiction is
proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State. Thus where the defendant 'deliberately' has
engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created 'continuing obligations' between himself
and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business
there, and because his activities are shielded by 'the benefits and protections' of the forum's laws it is
presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as
well .... So long as it creates a 'substantial connection' with the forum, even a single act can support
jurisdiction .. . . [However,] 'some single or occasional acts' related to the forum may not be sufficient
to establish jurisdiction if 'their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission' create
only an 'attenuated' affiliation with the forum. This distinction derives from the belief that, with respect to this category of 'isolated' acts, the reasonable foreseeability of litigation in the forum is substantially diminished.") (citations omitted); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776, 780-81 ("'A state has an especial
interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory. This is
because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to
afford protection, by providing that a tort-feasor shall be liable for damages which are the proximate
result of his tort' . . . . The plaintiff's residence is not, of course, completely irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. As noted, that inquiry focuses on the relations among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation. Plaintiff's residence may well play an important role in determining the propriety of
entertaining a suit against the defendant in the forum. That is, plaintiff's residence in the forum may,
because of defendant's relationship with the plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with the forum.
Plaintiff's residence may be the focus of the activities of the defendant out of which the suit arises. But
plaintiffs residence in the forum State is not a separate requirement, and lack of residence will not
defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant's contacts .. .. The victim of a libel, like the
victim of any other tort, may choose to bring suit in any forum with which the defendant has "certain
minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
120 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945) (citations omitted).
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of Internet communications, nor do they properly address the role of technological interactions in the modern human experience.
The utility of Calder's Effects test is diluted by its "express aiming" requirement, and Zippo's Sliding Scale test borders on unworkable. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and its grant of in rem personal jurisdiction has the
potential to deliver consistent jurisdictional determinations, but the benefits of
this provision are tempered by its narrow scope and the mutual burdens it imposes on plaintiffs and defendants.
Nevertheless, slight modifications to the Effects test and the Sliding Scale test
likely are the first steps for curing these deficiencies. As discussed in this article, if
use of the Sliding Scale is limited to determining general jurisdiction over individuals and businesses for their Internet-based activities, a modified version of the
Effects test can be utilized in cases where a non-resident uses the Internet to
reach beyond his or her physical location to cause an injury in a distant forum.
These changes are manageable, and would be further solidified by supplemental
statutory protections and the expanded availability of in rem jurisdiction in Internet-based disputes.
The Internet allows a person to reach out beyond his or her access point, and
to engage in contact with others in a way once only possible through direct physical contact. The analysis of personal jurisdiction must accommodate this reality.
A. Selected Provisions from the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1999) (emphasis added).

APPENDIx

(c) Dilution by blurring; dilution by tarnishment.
(5) Additional remedies. In an action brought under this subsection, the owner
of the famous mark shall be entitled to injunctive relief as set forth in section 34.
The owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in
sections 35(a) and 36 [15 USCS § III7(a) and 1118], subject to the discretion of
the court and the principles of equity if(A) the mark or trade name that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment was first used in commerce by the person against whom
the injunction is sought after the date of enactment of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006 [enacted Oct. 6, 2006]; and
(B) in a claim arising under this subsection(i) by reason of dilution by blurring, the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark;
or
(ii) by reason of dilution by tarnishment, the person against whom the
injunction is sought willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark
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(d) Cyberpiracy prevention.
(1)
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without
regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706
of title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code.
(B) (i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described
under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
to- [subsections (I) through (IX) are omitted]
(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found
in any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise
lawful.
(C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture or cancellation
of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the
mark.
(D) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph
(A) only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant's authorized licensee.
(E) As used in this paragraph, the term "traffics in" refers to transactions
that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration.
(2)
(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain
name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,domain name
registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain
name is located if(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c); and
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(ii) the court finds that the owner(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who
would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have
been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed
under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and email address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly
after filing the action.
(B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of
process.
(C) In an in rem action under this paragraph,a domain name shall be deemed
to have its situs in the judicial district in which(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority
that registered or assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the
court.
(D) (i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraphshall be limited
to a court orderfor the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a
United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall(I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish
the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and
use of the domain name to the court; and
(II) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during
the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court.
(ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority
shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph except in
the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order.
(3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy otherwise applicable.
(4) The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be in addition
to any other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam

